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Abstract
This essay’s starting point is scholarship describing the state practice of using law as a tool of mass atrocity, and
the part played by liberal trials in obscuring this ‘dark side’ of legality. It asks whether law’s complicity with
atrocity is only visible when one steps outside the legal arena, or whether there might be opportunities within
liberal legal institutions to develop what the essay calls self-reflexive law: rule of law mechanisms that expose
the part played by law in violence. To explore this question, the essay offers a close reading of a lawsuit in
which the key part played by law in atrocity was made explicit at trial: a class action filed in 1986 under the
Alien Tort Statute on behalf of 10,000 Philippine victims of torture and other gross abuses against Ferdinand
Marcos. Studying the representations of violence produced by the various participants in the litigation, the
essay attempts to elicit some of the legal and political conditions favorable to a self-reflexive law. The essay
offers a distinct version of ‘minor jurisprudence,’ recovering ‘minor’ practices within orthodox law itself,
namely oral trial proceedings, and attempting to derive insights from the minor in order to contribute to legal
design.
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Toward a Self-Reflexive Law? 
Narrating Torture’s Legality in 
Human Rights Litigation
Natalie R. Davidson*
In Law after Auschwitz: Towards a Jurisprudence of the Holocaust, David 
Fraser argues that criminal trials held in the post-war era in North 
America, England and Australia constructed a memory of the Nazi 
crimes that obscured the ‘legality of the Holocaust’ (2005: 216). He 
challenges the view, most famously advanced by American prosecutors 
at Nuremberg, of the Third Reich as a regime of brute force to which 
law is the corrective, by arguing that there is no radical discontinuity 
between law as practiced and understood by German jurists between 
1933 and 1945 and legal practice and reasoning in democracies. Fraser 
has been accused of adopting a reductive understanding of law as mere 
technique (Mertens 2007: 542-3), and in my view draws from the 
continuities between Nazi law and democratic law the unwarranted 
conclusion that there is no meaningful distinction between the two. 
Nevertheless, his book should be welcome for emphasizing law’s 
potentiality as a tool of physical atrocity, and the part played by trials 
in obscuring this ‘dark side’1 of legality. 
We are by now familiar with challenges to the law/violence 
dichotomy. Robert Cover famously observed that law facilitates the 
exercise of state violence, through the provision of justifications and 
the division of labor among actors (Cover 1986). Yet whereas Cover 
accepts this state of affairs as a necessary ‘disciplin[ing] ‘ of violence 
101
Toward a Self-Reflexive Law? Narrating Torture’s 
Legality in Human Rights Litigation
(1628), Fraser claims that legal discourse can be key to even the most 
extreme and arbitrary forms of violence. Moreover, given that trials 
are important contributors to collective memory (Savelsberg and King 
2011: 24), Fraser’s demonstration of the ways trials have obscured the 
legality of Nazi violence suggests that the public does not recognise 
the part play by law in heinous violence. As a result, law can continue 
to contribute to extreme violence unhindered. Thus, Fraser exposes 
the complicity with violence of two distinct layers of legality: the law 
of repressive states, and trials of mass atrocity. 
That responses to mass atrocity should better acknowledge law’s 
contribution to violence is all the more pressing in light of authoritarian 
regimes’ reliance on courts (Mayoral Diaz-Asenzio 2012), and the 
growing and paradoxical obsession with legal form accompanying 
widespread violence in the neo-liberal era (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2006b). If trials of atrocity, intensely publicized and reported upon, 
do not acknowledge the legality of much violence, we – lawyers and 
members of the public, including potential perpetrators – might fail 
to recognise mass atrocity when it is before us, cloaked with legal 
rationality and familiarity. Yet the principal legal mechanisms used to 
address mass atrocity, namely domestic and international criminal trials 
as well as truth commissions, do not appear to expose the legality of 
violence any better than the post-war criminal trials described by Fraser. 
These mechanisms are accused of concealing the bureaucratic, banal 
character of state-sponsored and organised repression (Leebaw 2011). 
To clarify the issue, we can follow Jothie Rajah in distinguishing 
between the ‘rule of law’ (law substantively infused with liberal 
principles and constraining arbitrary power) and the ‘rule by law’ (law 
in which there are no effective constraints on power) (Rajah 2012: 50; 
see Nonet and Selznick 2009 for a comparable distinction between 
‘autonomous law’ and ‘repressive law’). It seems that when rule of law 
mechanisms address mass violence, they are incapable of exposing the 
rule by law. In this way, rule of law mechanisms unwittingly shield the 
rule by law from scrutiny and challenge. But need this be the case? 
My concern lies not in the normative quandary of whether the 
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unjust laws of authoritarian regimes should be considered legitimate 
and applied (Hart 1958; Fuller 1958). Rather, I consider as an empirical 
matter the state practice of using law as a tool of mass atrocity. Is this 
practice only visible when one steps outside the legal arena, or might 
there be opportunities within liberal legal institutions to develop what 
I will call self-reflexive law – mass atrocity trials that could expose the 
part played by law in violence? 
To explore this question, I turn to a lawsuit in which the key part 
played by law in atrocity was made explicit: a class action filed in a 
Hawaii federal court on behalf of 10,000 Philippine victims of torture 
and other gross abuses against Ferdinand Marcos, one month after his 
ouster from power in 1986. The lawsuit was filed under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), a statute interpreted between 1980 and 2013 as granting 
U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits by foreign victims of gross 
human rights abuses even if committed outside the United States. 
The legal treatment of torture is a particularly fertile area in which 
to explore the possibility of self-reflexive law. Torture, as traditionally 
conceptualised by international lawyers, is an official act linked to 
the exercise of public power. If its prohibition is ‘emblematic of our 
determination to break the connection between law and brutality’ 
(Waldron 2005: 1739), international law must impliedly recognise the 
existence of that connection. Yet in practice, even among international 
lawyers, ‘[t]orture is more often understood to have arisen from 
primal or political impulses emerging in spite of law, than from the 
manipulation of legal language.’ (Johns 2012: 34).
 This paradox is on view in Marcos, where the legality of torture was 
made very clear at trial in the thick descriptions of repression provided 
by witnesses, while the courts, in their principled written decisions, 
exhibited great difficulty confronting law’s contribution to violence. 
This essay offers a close reading of the case inspired by scholarship on 
law’s representation of history (Douglas 2001), in an attempt to elicit 
some of the legal and political conditions under which a mass atrocity 
trial could expose, where relevant, the legality of extreme violence. 
This essay does not seek to explain the conditions favoring the 
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rule by law, though I suggest that trials of atrocity that obscure this 
phenomenon enable its recurrence. It focuses on the secondary layer 
of legality discussed by Fraser: atrocity trials. With respect to that 
layer, it does not propose a general model of law, such as the model 
of ‘responsive law’ furthering substantive justice advocated by Nonet 
and Selznick (2009). Instead, it draws attention to one by-product of 
atrocity trials, historical narratives about violence. My argument is not 
that judges or lawyers should consciously aim to expose the legality 
of violence or teach history, as this could undermine defendant rights. 
Rather, given the important part played by atrocity trials in the social 
construction of violence, I submit that when choosing among and 
designing legal responses to mass atrocity, we should give weight to 
those features that are favorable to rich historical accounts exposing 
the legality of violence.
The term ‘self-reflexive law’ is not meant to fully equate ATS 
litigation with martial law, or more generally the rule of law with 
the rule by law. It highlights however the commonalities between 
these forms of law, in particular the formalism which provides 
legal institutions an appearance of rationality and legitimacy. These 
commonalities suggest difficulties in exposing legal foundations of 
violence through legal proceedings. Through the Marcos case, this essay 
seeks to identify those difficulties and possibilities of overcoming them. 
My understanding of law as imbricated in violence and as 
contributing to the social construction of reality owes much to Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS). This essay departs from CLS not because of its 
attempt to harness the law in progressive ways, as much critical human 
rights scholarship has redemptive elements (Golder 2014). What 
distinguishes the present analysis from CLS is the methodology of 
critique and reconstruction: the analysis of the historical narratives 
produced in litigation. Critical scholars have historicized the law 
in order to recover alternative paths, but those efforts have typically 
focused on the doctrinal history of ‘mandarin’ texts (Gordon 1984: 120). 
This essay gives oral trial proceedings center stage not only because 
they are likely to make a significant contribution to lay constructions 
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of violence (with journalists more likely to report on them than to read 
appellate court decisions), but also because they are a rawer, richer 
source of narratives about violence. 
Drawing on CLS but analysing historical narratives, the present 
analysis offers a distinct version of ‘minor historical jurisprudence’, 
in the sense of a critical historical analysis (Tomlins 2015). Similarly 
to the line of minor jurisprudence associated with Peter Goodrich, 
this essay attempts to recover practices ‘denied or ignored’, ‘repressed 
or absorbed’ (Goodrich 1996: 3) in order to disrupt assumptions 
prevalent in mainstream legal scholarship. However, while scholars 
engaged in minor jurisprudence have turned to practices far removed 
from orthodox modes of law-making, such as literary texts, this essay 
suggests recovering ‘minor’ practices within orthodox law itself, 
namely oral trial proceedings. While trial proceedings are of course 
conventional sources of sociolegal history, neither they nor the historical 
narratives contained in them are conventional sources of normative legal 
analysis. This turn to the minor within the major reflects a less radical 
relation to the major than that offered by most authors in this collection. 
While their work is primarily disruptive and antifoundational, this 
essay attempts to derive insights from the minor in order to contribute 
to legal design. 
Part I provides background on the lawsuit. Part II shows that at trial 
the contribution of legal form and discourse to repression was made 
very clear for doctrinal and evidentiary reasons. Part III argues that 
these insights were lost in the court decisions disseminated throughout 
the legal community. The conclusion reflects on the possibilities of 
developing a self-reflexive law.
1. From Martial Law to the Alien Tort Statute
Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, before 
the end of his second term as elected president of the Philippines. 
Until February 1986, when he was deposed by a popular movement, he 
ruled in an authoritarian manner. Known as an exceptionally brilliant 
lawyer, Marcos endeavored to provide legal legitimacy to his regime, 
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seeking constitutional amendments and Supreme Court approvals 
of his concentrations of power. The regime’s attachment to law has 
been explained as a technique of rationalisation masking arbitrariness, 
along with a technocratic discourse of socio-economic development 
(Thompson 1995: 4). Both were partly geared toward international 
support: the technocratic discourse impressed international lenders, 
while the attachment to legal and democratic form pleased the United 
States, which provided Marcos unfailing economic, political and 
military support throughout most of his rule (Muego 1988: 129-30). 
Following the assassination in 1983 of opposition leader Benigno 
Aquino, Ronald Reagan’s administration urged Marcos to hold free 
elections to promote economic stability and restore political legitimacy 
(id 141). In February 1986, Marcos was announced winner of the 
elections against Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, but the polls had 
been clearly rigged. Aquino launched a successful civil disobedience 
campaign backed by the Catholic Church and a rebel group of officers. 
After receiving assurances that Aquino was a moderate, on the 3rd day 
of the ‘People Power Revolution,’ Reagan asked Marcos to resign, 
arranging for his flight to Hawaii (id 160-1). 
A number of human rights groups had helped to expose the 
hypocrisy of Marcos’ formally legal ‘democracy’. In 1986, Philadelphia 
attorney Robert Swift contacted these groups, which subsequently 
convinced victims to file claims. Few believed that the plaintiffs would 
win the case, but they hoped that the filing of the lawsuit could serve 
to document the extent of repression under Marcos. Thus, one month 
after Marcos and his entourage fled to Hawaii, five lawsuits, including 
one class action led by Swift, were filed against him in federal courts 
in California and Hawaii pursuant to the ATS, alleging torture, 
disappearances, and extrajudicial killing. Marcos died in 1989 while 
the litigation was pending, and was replaced thereafter by his estate, 
represented by his widow and son. 
The five cases, including the class action relating to ‘all civilian 
citizens of the Philippines, who, between 1972 and 1986, were 
tortured, summarily executed or ‘disappeared ‘ by Philippine military 
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or paramilitary groups’ (Order Granting Class Certification) were 
consolidated for trial in a federal court in the District of Hawaii. In 
1992, Marcos’ liability was determined by a six-member jury after two 
weeks of trial. While forty-four victims testified in person, the case 
rested largely on circumstantial evidence. Proving liability towards the 
class members who were not named plaintiffs required establishing a 
pattern of human rights violations that would indicate that thousands 
of similar violations had likely occurred (Fitzpatrick 1993). This 
evidence was provided through the testimony of eight expert witnesses, 
comprising members of international and Philippine human rights 
organisations, Philippine academics, and U.S. State Department 
officials, and legal documents, including legislation and decrees issued 
by Marcos, arrest orders and certificates of release. 
On September 22, 1992, the jury found the defendant liable for 
torture, summary execution and disappearance (In re Estate of Ferdinand 
E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460, hereinafter ‘910 
F. Supp.’: 1463-4). On February 23, 1994, the jury awarded the plaintiffs 
$1.2 billion in exemplary damages (Trial Transcript, hereinafter ‘TT ’, 
22 February 1994: 111-2). The third and compensatory damages phase 
of the litigation ended with an award of close to $800,000 to 9,541 
claimants (Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos 1996).  
Human rights lawyers have applauded the Marcos litigation for 
breaking new legal ground. Elsewhere, I analyse how the plaintiffs’ 
attempts to enforce their damage award have conf licted with 
transitional justice policy in the Philippines (Davidson 2017b). I have 
also argued that the participants in the Marcos litigation produced 
narratives that legitimated the neo-colonial relationship between the 
United States and the Philippines (Davidson 2017a).. In what follows 
I show that the case succeeded to some extent in exposing the legality 
of violence, and offer my interpretation of the conditions that enabled 
and constrained law’s self-reflexivity.
2. Self-Reflexity at Trial
At trial, law enabled the plaintiffs to connect Marcos to the acts of 
107
Toward a Self-Reflexive Law? Narrating Torture’s 
Legality in Human Rights Litigation
individual torturers and to prove a pattern of abuses that would apply 
to the entire class, in addition to being a form of documentary – and 
therefore ‘objective’ – evidence. However, the trial’s success in revealing 
law’s dark side was limited as plaintiffs presented martial law as 
resulting from the Philippines’ failure to properly follow the U.S. legal 
model. 
A. Law as Facilitator of Abuses
The plaintiffs presented the human rights violations as having been 
perpetrated by ‘a dictator’ (TT 9 September 1992: 17), in a ‘systematic 
and repetitive’ (id 13-14) manner. This notion of systematic state 
action derived from the definitions of torture, summary execution and 
disappearance under international law, which require official action, 
combined with the nature of class actions. Given that the defendant was 
at the top of a hierarchy of perpetrators, it would have been impossible to 
connect him to most victims without establishing a policy of repression. 
In the narrative put forward by the plaintiffs at trial, law played a 
key role in realizing the state’s policy of repression, and also provided 
concrete evidence of wrongdoing. The legal theory of liability was that 
of ‘command responsibility,’ a doctrine developed by the international 
military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, whereby defendants are 
held responsible for the actions of their subordinates. To establish 
Marcos’ personal liability, the jury was instructed that even if he had 
not directly ordered torture, summary execution and disappearance, his 
knowledge of these violations and failure to take effective measures to 
prevent them was a sufficient basis for liability (Final Jury Instructions: 
10). In relation to most victims, liability rested on failing to prevent 
abuses. To show that he had knowledge of the abuses, the plaintiffs 
tried to prove that he knew of the pattern of violations or even specific 
violations. This was done by showing that ‘Marcos received daily 
intelligence briefings and Marcos was informed of the fruits of the 
torture of high profile dissidents’ (TT 9 September 1992: 18), and that 
international human rights organisations and the U.S. government had 
approached Marcos and his circle to discuss the violations. In order 
to convince the jury that Marcos had the power to prevent the abuses, 
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the plaintiffs insisted that Marcos ‘was a micro manager, a hands-on 
person.’ (ibid). 
The plaintiffs’ theory of a tightly managed policy of repression 
probably concentrates excessive blame on Marcos, erasing the 
responsibility of his collaborators. However, this theory had the 
advantage of attributing to law a crucial facilitative role. First, the 
plaintiffs explained that Marcos’ constitutional maneuvers allowed 
him to concentrate power. In fact, as shall be explained shortly, 
constitutional law provided the overarching framework to understand 
the case. Second, the plaintiffs showed how legal formalism served to 
mask arbitrariness. 
After the opening statements, during which Swift explained that 
‘martial law created the opportunity for Ferdinand Marcos to commit 
human rights abuses’ and described Marcos’ extensive powers to order 
arrests and detention (id 17), the first expert witness called by the 
plaintiffs was constitutional law professor Father Joaquin Bernas, who 
testified ‘about the structure and practical legal effect of Philippine 
constitutional law and proclamations, decrees, general orders and letter 
of instruction enacted by Ferdinand E. Marcos between 1972 through 
1986’ (TT 10 September 1992: 10), Bernas opined that:
‘between September 21, 1972 and February 25, 1986, by virtue of the 
constitution which Mr. Marcos had declared ratified, and by virtue 
of his proclamations, decrees and other enactments, he exercised 
complete control over both the executive and legislative branches of 
government. He also significantly weakened the judicial system by 
transferring much of its jurisdiction to the military tribunals under his 
control. Moreover, the atmosphere he created seriously undermined 
the independence of the Supreme Court and other courts. He alone 
could appoint justices and judges.’ id 11). 
In order to explain his opinion, Bernas described in detail Marcos’ 
maneuvers to revise the constitution, ensuring his continued tenure 
and the expansion of his powers. He explained the coherent and 
hierarchical legal structure of repression, from the constitution down 
through the declaration of martial law, General Orders 2 and 2-A 
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that authorised the arrest by the military of listed individuals, to 
the individual arrest orders signed by Marcos. The jury was asked to 
become familiar with the regime’s bureaucratic jargon, hearing detailed 
expositions of the differences between three types of arrest order: the 
ASSO, PCO and PDA. Bernas explained how Marcos removed the 
judiciary’s independence through formal legality – by requiring all 
judges outside the Supreme Court ‘to submit their letter of resignation 
for acceptance or rejection by the President, so the President would hold 
it as long as he wanted to, or act on it whenever it was opportune for 
him to act on it’ (id 43). Legal events – the declaration of martial law 
in September 1972, a cosmetic lifting of martial law in January 1981, 
and the ‘notorious Amendment 6, which gave [Marcos] full legislative 
powers parallel and superior to that of the national assembly’ (id 18-19) 
– were presented as the milestones of repression. During his testimony, 
twelve laws, orders, decrees and letter of instruction signed by Marcos 
were introduced as exhibits. In other words, legal texts were offered as 
evidence of wrongdoing.
By recounting one of the jokes common in Philippine political 
culture, Bernas also conveyed the gap between the legal formality 
of the constitutional system and the arbitrariness of Marcos’ powers:
In Proclamation 1081, in which Marcos declared martial law, he 
stated that, and I quote, ‘all persons presently detained, as well as 
all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of 
insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed 
in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in 
connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the 
law of the nations, crime against public order, crimes involving the 
usurpation of authority, rank, title and the improper use of names, 
uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and 
for such other crimes as will be enumerated in orders that I shall 
subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of 
any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me 
personally, or promulgated upon my direction, shall be kept under 
detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly 
designated representative’. Whereas, the current joke had it, ‘until 
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released by me or by Julie’. (id 14). 
It was important for the plaintiffs to show that law provided a cover 
for arbitrariness in order to explain the context of the human rights 
violations, as well as to counter the line of defense. The overall defense 
can be reconstructed as follows: Martial law was declared in accordance 
with the constitution, and was necessary given instability in the country; 
Marcos did not personally order or know about the abuses, for which 
responsibility lies fully with the military; and the human rights abuses 
were not as numerous as claimed by the plaintiffs (id 45). To support 
these points, defense counsel argued that victims of abuse had legal 
recourses in the Philippines (TT 9 September 1992: 45-7). Throughout 
the trial they made reference to the holding of elections and the formal 
legality of Marcos’ rule as well as to the complaints procedures put in 
place by the regime to address claims of abuse by the military. 
Other experts on behalf of the plaintiffs echoed Bernas’ view of law 
as having facilitated repression under Marcos, and this in order to link 
Marcos to the human rights violations committed by his subordinates. 
Describing Decree 1850 that gave military courts exclusive jurisdiction 
over cases involving human rights violations committed by Philippine 
security forced, expert witness Prof. Dianne Orentlicher insisted 
that ‘[t]his decree exemplifies a general characteristic of Ferdinand 
Marcos’s leadership, one that is critical to understanding his personal 
responsibility for the violations that I’ve described. Marcos created a 
legal framework that enabled abuses to occur and enabled them to occur 
based on the predilections of one man.’ (TT 18 September 1992:126). 
This constitutional framework or ‘legal atmosphere’ having been 
established by the experts, the individual victim testimonies and 
exhibits added evidence about law’s repressive uses under Marcos. For 
each victim testifying, an arrest or temporary release order was put in 
evidence to prove the arrest had taken place. Many victims were asked 
if they recalled when martial law was declared – that legal event being 
the defining moment of the dictatorship. Through their testimonies, 
law even appears as a pervasive presence in the everyday experience 
of repression. In the more than forty testimonies of victims, a pattern 
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of suppression of dissent emerges: potential critics of the regime were 
arrested with an arrest order, ‘broken’ through torture and months – 
sometimes years – of detention in ‘rehabilitation centers,’ and released 
with a Temporary Release Order, which often required them to report 
regularly to the military or police. While on temporary release, it was 
close to impossible for them to find employment, as they lacked security 
clearance. Following years of good behavior, they would sometimes 
be granted a final release order and finally be left alone by the security 
services. In this way, torture and the terror created by the salvaging 
and disappearance of other dissidents were only the initial stages of a 
long-term bureaucratic system of suppression of dissent.
The testimony of Adora Faye de Vera, a student activist for the 
women and the poor who was arrested, tortured and raped during nine 
months, after which she was turned into an agent for the government, 
provides a vivid account of the formal use of law by the regime in its 
relations with its victims. She described how upon becoming an agent, 
she was made to sign a number of absurd-sounding documents:
‘In March 1977, I signed an agent’s agreement, I signed a purchase 
of information agreement, I signed a sworn statement saying I was 
arrested alone, that I didn’t know where Flora and Rolando [the friends 
arrested with her and later killed] were, and admitting that I was a 
subversive, and I also signed a waiver saying that I wasn’t tortured 
and that everything I was signing was not under duress.’ (TT 14 
September 1992: 41). 
Expert witness Michael Posner, Executive Director of the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, also testified that ‘[t]orture victims were 
regularly forced to sign statements that they had not been badly treated.’ 
(TT 15 September 1992: 26-7). These documents cannot be viewed 
simply as tools for the regime to cover its traces, counter-evidence 
to be provided to human rights monitors, courts or governmental 
commissions in the event of accusations of abuses, though that is 
undoubtedly part of the story. Some of these documents, such as the 
‘agent’s agreement’ and ‘purchase of information agreement’ were 
unlikely to ever be shown to a third party. Moreover, one witness 
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testified to having signed, upon release from detention and torture, a 
‘pledge of allegiance where we need not to, you know, be interviewed, 
to talk with anybody.’ (TT 18 September 1992: 42). One can surmise 
that the regime believed such documents would have some persuasive 
force in silencing victims, and possibly making repression appear more 
legitimate to the security forces and low-level torturers and bureaucrats 
themselves. If that was the case, then law was not only used to centralise 
power and legitimate the regime vis-à-vis foreign donors and the 
Philippine public, but also to control victims and perpetrators. 
B. Martial Law as Degenerate Law
Regrettably, these insights about the dark sides of law were 
understood to be limited to non-Western law. Indeed, in order to 
explain the intricacies of Philippine constitutional law to a jury of 
ordinary Americans, the plaintiff lawyers and expert witnesses drew 
comparisons with the U.S. constitution. The result was a representation 
of martial law as a distortion or degenerate form of U.S. law. Typical 
of such a comparison was the opening speech of plaintiff counsel 
Randall Scarlett:
‘Just as President Reagan only had two terms here, under their constitution, 
we will learn, that President Marcos could only do two terms there. 
That term was to end in 1973. What he did instead was a systematic 
or system wide change to the entire government that allowed him to 
remain in power for 13 years beyond 1973 and become a consummate 
dictator of the Republic of the Philippines.’ (TT 9 September 1992: 
40, emphasis added)
Bernas explained that before Marcos revised the constitution, 
‘[t]he 1935, Philippine Constitution closely resembled the American 
Constitution as to the structure of government. It provided for three 
branches of government, executive, legislative and judicial, and for 
an elected president. The president was given a term of 4 years with a 
maximum of two terms for a total maximum of 8 consecutive years. 
It also contained a bill of rights borrowed largely from the United States 
Federal Constitution.’ (TT 10 September 1992:11-12, emphasis added)
The didactic advantages of such a comparative approach are clear, 
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and none of the cited statements are inaccurate. However, the experts 
failed to mention that not only the separation of powers and the 
bill of rights, but also the very possibility of declaring martial law 
and suspending rights, were a legacy of U.S. colonialism. Indeed, 
this possibility had been introduced into Philippine law by the U.S. 
Congress in 1916, and the provision of the 1935 Constitution copied 
the wording of the U.S. legislation.2 Similarly, the possibility of 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus was initially granted to the 
American Governor General by the 1902 Philippine Bill, and had 
been used by him in 1905.3 In the 1970s and 1980s the United States 
had also contributed much to the Marcos regime’s parody of the rule 
of law by insisting that the regime periodically provide appearances 
of electoral democracy and legality. By offering a very partial picture 
of the American legal legacy in the Philippines, the trial limited the 
law’s self-reflexivity: law was understood to have a repressive potential 
outside the United States. 
Indeed, the possibility that the American counterparts could also 
degenerate into repression was implicitly denied. Expert witness Posner 
stated in his testimony on the subservience of the judiciary to Marcos: 
‘It may be difficult for U.S. citizens to comprehend how a strong and 
independent civilian court system was seriously undermined by a series 
of martial law decrees issued by Mr. Marcos himself.’(TT 15 September 
1992: 24). Similarly, when witness Ramon Mappala, a former member 
of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps in the Philippines, testified 
about his arrest after he had given a lecture ‘about the Marcos regime 
tendency towards going towards martial law’, Swift asked him whether 
the lecture was critical of the Marcos regime. He answered: ‘I was 
highly critical, yes, sir. I’m very much familiar with democratic process 
of the United States.’ (TT 17 September 1992: 87). 
While this limitation of law’s dark side to non-Western or non-
US law can be traced to ethnocentrism, strategic factors were also 
likely at work. For Swift, avoiding discussions of U.S. support of the 
regime was necessary in order to win the case.4 This limit to law’s 
self-reflexivity might be seen as peculiar to legal processes with juries. 
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However, courts and prosecutors engaged in proceedings concerning 
mass atrocity generally face heightened legitimacy concerns, leading 
them to produce ‘tortured history’ (Douglas 2001: 113). Indeed, the 
next section shows how legitimacy concerns among appellate courts 
in Marcos ultimately obscured the legality of repression. 
3. Self-Reflexity in the Courts
In their descriptions of the facts of the case, the courts reproduced the 
plaintiffs’ narrative of the Marcos regime as grounded in a constitutional 
arrangement (e.g. 910 F. Supp., 1462). Moreover, they occasionally 
discussed the human rights violations as having been state-sponsored, 
as required by doctrinal considerations, such as the definition of torture 
under international law. Yet in their discussions of legal doctrine, the 
courts generally portrayed the violations in a manner that is difficult 
to reconcile with an understanding of law as a facilitator of violence. 
Even when the District Court discussed the element in the definition of 
torture that connects it to the law (the requirement the court had crafted 
that torture be done ‘under color of law’), it explained that element as an 
abuse or imitation of law. The court instructed the jury thus: 
‘Torture, summary execution, disappearance or arbitrary detention 
committed by a person under color of law violates international law, 
United States law and Philippine law and renders that person liable 
to the victim. The phrase ‘under color of law’ means that the person 
allegedly responsible, here Ferdinand Marcos, used his government 
position as President of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief 
of the military, paramilitary and intelligence forces to act beyond the 
bounds of his lawful authority. In order for Marco’s (sic) alleged unlawful 
acts to have been done ‘under color of law,’ the unlawful acts must 
have been done while Marcos was purporting or pretending to act in the 
performance of his official duties. That is to say, the unlawful acts must 
consist of an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by Marcos 
only because he was a government official. Color of law as used in 
these instructions means action purported to be taken by an official of a 
government under any law of that country.’ (Final Jury Instructions: 
9, emphases added).
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One possible explanation for this construction of torture as an 
abuse of law is that it is easier to show a violation of a legal norm if the 
violation itself is portrayed as non-law. In the context of transnational 
human rights litigation, this portrayal is as much a question of being 
legally ‘correct’ – ie proving a violation – as it is a question of legitimacy, 
for a foreign court will have more difficulty justifying its intervention 
if it is judging an act that was legal in the country in which it was 
committed. Another explanation relates to the law’s uneasy blending 
of descriptive and normative functions. The court can be taken here to 
be explaining that torture, summary execution and disappearance are 
abuses of the law as it should be, in the process obscuring that these 
abuses relied on the law as it is.
In addition, specific doctrines in U.S. law, as in many jurisdictions, 
preclude domestic courts from adjudicating the acts of foreign states. 
The lawsuits had originally been dismissed under the act of state 
doctrine, a doctrine that prevents courts from judging the public acts 
of another sovereign state committed within that sovereign’s territory 
(Trajano v. Marcos). Moreover, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976 (FSIA), foreign governments are immune from suit in 
the U.S. except for categories of claims that reflect liability arising out 
of private law transactions. Though the plain language of the FSIA 
suggests that it is not applicable to individual defendants, and that 
is indeed how it was interpreted in 2011 by the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Samantar v. Yousuf 2010), this was not clear at the time of Marcos. In 
fact, in an earlier case also involving the Philippines, the Ninth Circuit 
itself had held that the FSIA could be invoked by individual defendants 
(Chuidian v Philippine National Bank), and Marcos’ estate argued that 
Marcos’ acts were immunised under the FSIA (Hilao v. Marcos 1994). 
In Marcos, the courts rejected the applicability of these doctrines by 
presenting the human rights abuses as personal wrongdoing abusive of 
the constitutional and legal framework rather than repression enabled 
by that framework. 
When in 1989, the Ninth Circuit determined that the act of state 
doctrine was not applicable to Marcos because he was a former dictator, 
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it referred to its 1988 decision in Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos in 
which it had insisted that ‘Marcos is a private citizen residing in the 
United States.’ (Trajano v. Marcos). The Ninth Circuit applied the same 
reasoning in a 1994 appeal by Marcos’ estate from a District Court 
decision enjoining the estate from dissipating assets pending litigation: 
‘the Estate argues that Marcos’ acts were premised on his official 
authority, and thus fall within FSIA. However… Marcos’ actions 
should be treated as taken without official mandate pursuant to his 
own authority.’ (Hilao v. Marcos 1994, 1470-1).
The Court also cited its own decision in Republic of the Philippines 
v. Marcos, referring to the comparison to rape, a crime with intensely 
personal connotations:
‘Although sometimes criticized as a ruler and at times invested with 
extraordinary powers, Ferdinand Marcos does not appear to have had 
the authority of an absolute autocrat. He was not the state, but the 
head of the state, bound by the laws that applied to him. Our courts 
have had no difficulty in distinguishing the legal acts of a deposed 
ruler from his acts for personal profit that lack a basis in law…. the 
latter acts are as adjudicable and redressable as would be a dictator’s 
act of rape.’ (id 1471). 
Commentators have criticised the Ninth Circuit for failing to 
develop a principled approach to the act of state doctrine and sovereign 
immunity. With respect to both, the court distinguished Marcos on the 
facts –the supposedly personal nature of the defendant’s acts – instead 
of carving out a human rights exception to the doctrines (Fitzpatrick 
1993: 511), as the English House of Lords would later do in Pinochet, 
where it held that torture could not be considered a state function for 
the purposes of functional immunity (R. v. Commissioner of Police for 
the Metropolis and Others). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in 2012 followed in Pinochet ’s footsteps, when it recognised 
that torture could be ‘performed in the course of the foreign official’s 
employment by the Sovereign’ yet not count as an official act for 
purposes of immunity (Samantar v. Yousuf 2012). However, such 
a principled approach might have been too much to ask in Marcos, 
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where the U.S. courts’ legitimacy in exercising an extraordinary form 
of jurisdiction was more questionable than in Pinochet,5 and the courts 
were exposed to the charge of intruding on U.S. foreign policy.6 Marcos 
was thus held liable, but this liability was portrayed as more personal 
than institutional. 
Conclusion
How can we use the Marcos case to begin thinking about developing 
law’s self-reflexivity? 
While trial proceedings offered opportunities for rich, detailed 
discussions of constitutional structure, legal formalism and victims’ 
experiences of law, the more abstract discussions of higher courts erased 
and obscured the legality of violence. Yet it is precisely these higher 
court decisions that are diffused throughout the legal community, 
concealing the insights gleaned during the lower court proceedings. 
This essay has attempted to recover those insights, in the belief that 
exposing and understanding law’s ‘dark side’ should become central to 
the project of fighting mass atrocity. Such a project should, however, 
abandon the assumption implicit in Marcos that law in the U.S. and 
by extension other Western democracies cannot be used to such 
repressive ends. Recovery and critical analysis of trial proceedings 
is one step; using these proceedings along with historical writing as 
teaching materials in law schools might also hold some promise. These 
steps would mainstream what has until now been considered a ‘minor’ 
source of law.
Having recovered trial proceedings, analyses of the type conducted 
here can also help elicit axes of inquiry for the design of self-reflexive 
legal responses to mass atrocity, effecting a shift from a minor to a 
major form of jurisprudence. The detailed and contextualized nature 
of the present analysis, in which the historical narratives produced 
in Marcos are understood against the background of later doctrinal 
developments, enabled me to make such a shift without falling into 
the trap of overbroad generalizations. The following illustrates the sort 
of shift I have in mind:
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A first axis of inquiry might concern the type of defendant, from 
head of state to low-level perpetrator. In Marcos, the fact that the 
litigation took the form of a class action against a former head of state 
significantly contributed to the representation of law as violent. The 
need to prove a pattern of violations that could reach all members of 
the class led the plaintiffs to offer numerous testimonies of experts, 
witnesses and victims themselves as well as legal documents as evidence, 
leading to discussions of law as enabling violence. While this points 
to the class action as a valuable mechanism through which to address 
mass atrocity, other legal mechanisms targeting high-level perpetrators 
might have similar effects: when the definition of an international 
crime or international human right, or theory of responsibility requires 
understanding the broader context, proving a policy, or considering the 
abuse’s effects on a large number of victims, law and legal documents 
might serve to explain techniques of concentration of power, or of 
legitimation of violence, or to ‘connect the dots’ between the defendant 
and various actors involved in mass atrocity. 
A second axis concerns the applicable legal norms, from various 
forms of international law to domestic law. The Marcos case shows that 
international human rights law’s traditional focus on state-sponsored 
violence carries the possibility of addressing law’s contribution to 
violence because of requirements of officialness in the definition of 
torture. The courts’ construction of the litigated violence as personal 
rather than institutionalised reflects to a certain extent the limitations 
of early case-law on the issue of torture and immunity, case-law which 
has since evolved. 
Jurisdiction might constitute a third axis. We saw that the 
distortions in the plaintiffs’ and courts’ narratives about the Marcos 
regime derived in part from attempts to avoid alienating the jury and 
appearing to interfere in a foreign country’s government, respectively. 
The fact that legitimacy concerns affect the ability to produce rich 
narratives about mass violence suggests that domestic courts exercising 
universal jurisdiction as well as international tribunals, if they lack 
strong legitimacy, might have limited abilities to expose the legality 
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of violence, as opposed to domestic courts judging their country’s prior 
regime. This would seem especially true if the foreign domestic court 
is, like the United States in Marcos, implicated in the establishment 
of the colonial legal order from which the litigated violence emerged. 
My interpretation of the District Court’s construction of torture 
as an abuse of law seems to point to inherent limitations of the legal 
process for facing the legality of violence: the tendency to present 
violations of legal norms as non-law, and to blend descriptive and 
normative functions of judgment. This might point to a fourth axis, 
concerning the degree of legalism of the institution, from criminal 
trials where guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, to quasi-
legal mechanisms such as truth commissions where public testimony 
and confession take centre stage, without requiring a determination 
that norms have been violated. Truth commissions’ relaxation of legal 
requirements certainly have advantages for the production of rich, 
structural narratives about violence (though as argued by Leebaw 2011, 
in practice they been conducted under legalist approaches). I would 
argue nevertheless that giving up on the possibility of self-reflexivity 
within legal processes would be overly deterministic. International legal 
scholars have begun developing theories of adjudication that explicitly 
seek to distinguish between descriptive and aspirational functions of 
judgment (Mohamed 2014). Marcos might be taken to suggest that 
as a strategic matter, we should pursue these projects in established 
institutions enjoying strongest legitimacy, as the case shows how courts 
exercising controversial forms of jurisdiction insist on their authority 
by drawing sharp distinctions between their own legality and that of 
the defendant.
The Marcos case exposes the close imbrication of brutal violence, law 
and settler colonialism, and the difficulties of undoing such violence 
within the postcolonial framework of international law. Yet rather than 
condemning us to despair, this detailed historical analysis revealed 
the web of contingent doctrinal limitations, litigation strategies, 
political constraints and cultural assumptions that shaped the historical 
narratives in this case, suggesting paths for reconstruction. It is in this 
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sense that, to me, minor jurisprudence offers a mode of legal theorizing 
beyond critique.
Endnotes
* Lecturer (Assistant Professor), Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv 
University. I thank Saira Mohamed, the workshop participants, and the 
reviewers for very helpful comments.
1. In using the expression ‘dark side’ I draw on Kennedy 2005.
2. P.L. 240 (Organic Act for the Philippine Islands) granted the right to 
declare martial law to the Governor-General of the Philippines. Muego 
1988: 29.
3. The only other suspension of the writ occurred in 1950 when President 
Quirino had used it to cope with a peasant insurgency. Id 31.
4. Telephone interview, 4 December 2014.
5. The Pinochet case did not raise as many questions about the court’s 
legitimacy since it was based on an interpretation of the Convention 
against Torture, which explicitly provided universal jurisdiction, and 
in 1988 the United Kingdom had changed its criminal code to grant its 
courts universal jurisdiction.
6. The Reagan administration began urging courts to decline jurisdiction of 
human rights ATS claims in 1984. Stephens 2014: 1486.
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